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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
















MILDRED L. WOODWARD, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18089 
This is an appeal from a portion of the Decree of 
Divorce awarding Respondent a one-fourth interest in any 
retirement benefits Appellant receives, as he receives them. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The parties were divorced on October 9, 1981. The 
trial court, Honorable Venoy Christoffersen, presiding, made 
a roughly equal· division of all marriage assets with the 
exception of the husband's civil service retirement. The 
1 
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retirement asset was isolated from all other assets in the 
court's property division, and the court awarded to the wife 
a one-fourth interest in all proceeds received through said 
retirement plan, as they are received by the husband. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks an affirmation of the trial 
court's division of the assets of the parties including the 
disposition of the civil service retirement. 
Defendant-Respondent also requests that the case be remanded 
to the trial court for an additional award of attorney's 
fees incurred on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties' divorce trial was heard on October 9, 1981 
with the Honorable Venoy Christoffersen, District Judge, 
presiding. The court entered its decision awarding the 
divorce to Plaintiff-Appellant on his complaint, as well as 
to Defendant-Respondent on her counterclaim (T-76). (For 
purposes of clarity, Plaintiff-Appellant will hereafter be 
referred to as husband, and Defendant-Respondent will 
hereafter be referred to as wife). custody of the four 
minor children and possession of the home were not contested 
2 
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by the wife, and were subsequently awarded by the court to 
the husband. 
The court isolated the husband's retirement benefit 
from all other items of property, both real and personal. 
The court then made a roughly equal division of these other 
assets (T-69 to 71). 
With regards to the civil service retirement, the court 
found that the husband had worked for civil service for 15 
years, approximately the same length of time as the parties' 
marriage (R-71). The court reasoned that since he would 
have to work another 15 years to obtain full retirement 
benefits, the wife would be entitled to one-fourth of his 
ultimate benefit, in other words, one-half of the amount 
accumulated by the husband during the marriage (T-72). The 
court did not mandate that this include amounts contributed 
by the government, rather the court indicated that the award 
would include amounts contributed by the government only if 
the husband actually receives such benefits (T-72). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS CASE IS CLEARLY DISTINGUISHED 
FROM THE BENNETT CASE. 
The appellant cites as sole authority for his position 
the case of Bennett v. Bennett 607 P.2d 839 (Utah 1980). 
3 
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There are one or two similarities between the cases. In 
both cases the husband-appellant was a civilian employee 
working at Hill Force Base. As such, they were covered 
under the same civil service plan. At this point the 
similarities between the two cases end. 
Bennett 
In the Bennett case, the trial judge made a lump sum 
distribution of the retirement benefit. This was the result 
of several important factors. First, the trial judge valued 
the husband's retirement at a specific dollar figure, 
apparently including therein so-called "matching funds" from 
the government. 
Second, in Bennett the retirement fund was treated as 
one component of the entire marital assets .. By awarding 
the entire retirement fund to the husband in his portion of 
the assets, the trial court placed the burden entirely on 
him for all future contingencies concerning the retirement 
fund. 
Third, alternative ways for disposition of the 
retirement fund were not considered in the Bennett case, 
either at the trial level or on appeal. A review of the 
Bennett opinion and the briefs filed in connection with 
the case makes clear that no one ever raised the possibility 
of a "time rule" approach. (This will be discussed 
4 
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hereafter). Additionally, in the present case appellant 
formulates the issue before the court as one involving 
"non-vested retirement benefits". The terms "vested" and 
"non-vested" appear nowhere in the Bennett opinion. 
Fourth, there is in civil service retirement no such 
thing as a "matching amount from the government". This is 
borne out by the explanation of benefits made in the copy of 
the plan admitted into evidence. (R-31 Part III) This is 
also supported by language from the Bennett opinion. 
"The retirement officer further testified, 
'the amount of money that he (plaintiff) 
has in the retirement fund does not have any 
bearing on what he would get under retire-
ment monthly annuity.'" Bennett supra 840. 
Because of the foregoing it was clearly error for the trial 
judge in Bennett to attempt to place a dollar value on the 
retirement fund including "matching funds from the 
government" and allocate the entire amount as a lump sum in 
the husband's portion of the property division. 
Woodward 
The trial judge in the present case applied the "time 
rule" in making an equitable distribution of the retirement 
fund asset. The time rule is based on the concept that the 
non-employee spouse's share in the retirement fund is 
directly proportionate to the amount of time the spouse 
5 
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contributed to that fund during the marriage. Thus, the 
time rule determines marital interest in a retirement fund 
by computing the ratio of the time of marriage during which 
pension benefits were earned to the total years of service 
during which the pension is earned. This percentage is then 
applied against the retirement income received. The 
non-employee spouse would then receive one-half of this 
amount as representing her half of the marital asset. 
By applying the time rule, the judge treated the 
retirement fund entirely different from the trial court's 
approach in the Bennett case in several significant aspects. 
First, in the present case no specific dollar amount was 
ever assigned to the retirement fund as a marriage asset 
{T-7 2) . 
Second, the retirement fund was isolated from all other 
marital assets and disposed of separately. The court made 
an equitable division of all marriage assets except the 
retirement fund awarding roughly one-half of the value of 
these to each party {T-70,71). The court then turned to the 
retirement fund and made an equitable division thereof 
{T-71,72). The court in effect divided two pies. The 
wisdom in this approach is that it does not place an undue 
burden on either party ~or future contingencies concerning 
the asset. Both parties bear this burden in direct 
relation to their proportionate interest in the asset. 
6 
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Third, in the present case other alternatives for 
disposition of the retirement fund were considered and 
rejected by the court. The wife's proposed division of the 
major marital assets suggested the court make a lump sum 
distribution of the retirement fund (T-55,56). The 
rejection of this proposal in favor of the time rule 
approach demonstrates the wisdom of an experienced trial 
judge. 
Fourth, the time rule approach eliminates the need for 
an abstr.act discussion concerning such concepts as matching 
funds, vesting, non-vesting, etc. Regardless of what future 
contingencies occur, the parties know with certainty what 
proportions they will receive, thus equitable division of 
the marriage assets is guaranteed. 
POINT II 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE ADOPTED 
THE TIME RULE APPROACH IN SIMILAR 
CASES. 
In view of the foregoing discussion of the significant 
distinctions between the Bennett case and this case, 
Respondent submits that the issue presently before the court 
is: 
"Are non-vested pension benefits con-
tingent property interests rather than 
mere expectancies?" 
7 
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It appears that this is an issue of first impression in our 
jurisdiction. However, it has been litigated in a number of 
other states; most significantly, California. 
The Brown Case 
In 1976, the California Supreme Court issued its 
decision in the case of In Re Marriage of Brown 544 P.2d 561 
(Cal. 1976), Respondent Robert Brown had worked for the 
telephone company during most of the marriage. At trial the 
court refused to consider the non-vested pension rights of 
the husband as community property, even though he had 
accumulated 72/78ths of the time necessary to qualify for 
retirement benefits. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice 
Tobriner reversed a 35 year old precedent, and stated: 
" ... Non-vested pension rights are not an 
expectancy but a contingent interest in 
property; •.. Pension rights, whether or not 
vested, represent a property interest; to 
the extent that such rights derived from 
empioyment during coverture, they comprise 
a community asset subject to division in a 
dissolution proceeding." Brown Supra 562, 
563. 
The court then defined the differences between 
non-vested pension rights and a mere expectancy. 
"The term expectancy describes the interest 
of a person who merely foresees that he 
might receive a future beneficence, such 
as the interest of an heir apparent ••• , or 
of a beneficiary designated by a living 
insured who has a right to change the 
beneficiary ... As these examples demonstrate, 
8 
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the defining characteristic of an expec-
tancy is that its holder has no enforceable 
right to his beneficence. 
Although some jurisdictions classify retire-
ment pensions as gratuities, it has long 
been settled that under California law such 
benefits 'do not derive from the bene-
ficence of the employer, but are properly 
part of the consideration earned by the 
employee'" •.. the employee's right to such 
benfits is a contractual right, derived 
from the terms of the employment contract . 
•.. a contractual right is not an expectancy 
but a chose in action, a form of property. 
. . . 
We conclude that French v French, and subse-
quent cases erred in characterizing nonvested 
pension rights as expectancies and in denying 
the trial courts the authority to divide such 
rights as community property. This mischarac-
terization of pension rights has, and unless 
overturned, will continue to result in inequi-
table division of community assets. Over the 
past decades, pension benefits have become an 
increasingly significant part of the consider-
ation earned by the employee for his services." 
Brown Supra, pages 565, 566. 
The court then turned to the practical question of how 
to distribute such a community asset. 
" .•. if the court concludes that because of 
uncertainties affecting the vesting or 
maturation of the pension that it should 
not attempt to divide the present value of 
pension rights, it can instead award each 
spouse an appropriate portion of each 
pension payment as it is paid. This method 
of dividing the community interest in the . 
pension renders it unnecessary for the court 
to compute the present value of the pension 
rights, and divides equally the risk that 
the pension will fail to vest." Brown Supra 
567. 
9 
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It is, of course, to be noted that California is a 
community property state, and Utah is not. However, for 
purposes of treatment of retirement benefits, the 
distinction is not significant. Whether these pension 
rights are termed "community property" or a "marital asset", 
practical concepts of equity and fairness mandate the 
same result. Additionally it would appear Utah Law 
sanctions this result inasmuch as the relevant state statute 
requires the trial court to "make such orders in relation to 
the ... property ... as may be equitable." (See U.C.A. 30-3-5 
1953 as amended). 
Other Community Property States Have 
Also Required an Equitable Division 
Of Non-Vested Pension Rights 
In the same year as the Brown decision, the Supreme 
Court of Texas addressed this issue. The Texas opinion, 
Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Texas 1976), quotes 
extensively from Brown and establishes that all pension 
interests, whether vested or non-vested, are community 
property subject to division in divorce proceedings. The 
time rule as previously discussed is the standard for 
allocation. 
10 
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The State of Washington has been the earliest in 
holding that unvested pension interests are subject to 
distribution in divorce proceedings. Perhaps the best 
evidence of this comes from a concise statement and 
citations contained in the opinion of the court in In Re 
Marriage of Pea, 566 P.2d 212 (Washington 1977). At page 
213, writing for a unanimous court, Judge Pearson stated: 
"It is clear that retirement pay even 
though benefits are not presently 
available, is held to be deferred com-
pensation and subject to equitable 
distribution under RCW 26.09.080." 
Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash.2d 364, 534 
P.ed 1355 (1975); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 
5. Wash.App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971). 
A Number of Common Law States 
Have Also Treated Non-Vested Retirement Benefits 
As Marriage Assets 
The New Jersey courts have consistently held pension 
benefits to be marital property, without any reference to 
"vesting". In the case of Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257 
(New Jersey 1975) at page 262 the court stated: 
"We take the opportunity •.. to suggest 
that the concept of vesting should 
probably find no significant place in 
the developing law of equitable dis-
tribution." 
Most recently in Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76 (New 
Jersey 1981), the following clarification was made as to the 
law in the state of New Jersey. 
" .•. where other assets for equitable 
distribution are inadequate or lacking 
11 
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altogether, or where no present value 
can be established and the parties are 
unable to reach agreement, resort must 
be had to a form of deferred distribution 
based upon fixed percentages. In such 
event, the trial judge must determine 
how best to accomplish equitable dis-
tribution of all distributable property 
including, as appropriate, the sharing 
in fixed percentages of the pension 
payments when received. Kikkert Supra 80. 
The Wisconsin courts have likewise held pension 
interests includable as marital property, and have noted 
that this is of ten the largest available asset in the 
marital estate. Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 226 N.W.2d 518 
(1975). 
Most recently in the case of Selchert v. Selchert, 280 
N.W.2d 293 (Wisconsin 1979), the court of appeals stated: 
" ... the trial court could use a method 
widely employed in other states, whereby 
the trial court determines what percentage 
of the marital property each spouse is to 
receive, and then divides payments from 
the pension plan accordingly. Under this 
approach it is unnecessary to make any 
determination as to the value of the pension 
fund. The only consideration is the appro-
priate percentage of the marital property to 
which each spouse is entitled ••• When the bene-
ficiary spouse then opts to receive payments 
under the pension plan, the non-covered 
spouse would be entitled to her established 
percentage of those payments ... This method 
may be particularly appropriate where the 
present value of a pension fund is very 
difficult or impossible to assess. 
Selchert Supra. 298. 
In a 1978 case the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Elliot 
v. Elliot 274 N.W.2d 75 (Minn.1978), observed that other 
12 
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jurisdictions have almost unanimously ruled that such 
pension benefits are property. (See Footnote 8 at page 77 
of the opinion, which catalogs the various jurisdictions.) 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED. 
While many states have not yet ruled on this issue, it 
appears clear that the trend is towards including contingent 
pension interests as marital assets. 
This court has on numerous previous occasions 
elucidated the wide range of discretion enjoyed by a trial 
judge in making a division of marital property. No one is in 
a better position than the trial judge who has heard all of 
the testimony and observed the parties, to determine 
fairness as between the parties.· Modifying the order in 
this case would necessitate restructuring the entire 
property division. It would most certainly require that the 
wife's lien against the home be increased in value and 
perhaps bear interest. It also would reopen the issue of 
alimony, inasmuch as Judge Christoffersen in making his 
decision may have felt he had provided for the wife in later 
years. It would serve no useful purpose to relitigate all 
of these issues. 
13 
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Judge Christoffersen's decision is in harmony with 
prior Utah law. As has already been shown, the Bennett case 
is clearly distinguishable from this case. Also U.C.A. 
30-3-5 has been shown to be in harmony with the court's 
ruling. Finally, the most relevant precedent in Utah is 
also in harmony with the Judge's ruling. In Englert v. 
Englert, this court ·stated: 
"It is our opinion that the correct 
view under our law is that this (UCA 30-3-5) 
encompasses all of the assets of every 
nature possessed by the parties, whenever 
obtained and from whatever source derived; 
and that this includes any such pension 
fund or insurance." Englert v Englert, 
576 P.2d 1274, 1276 Utah 1978. {Emphasis 
added) . 
It must be concluded that when the court says "all of the 
assets of every nature" this includes non-vested or 
contingent pension interests. 
Finally, the trial court's order should be affirmed 
because the court's ruling involves sound social policy. In 
addressing this very issue in an article in the Journal of 
Family Law, the authors state: 
" ... sound social policy and the facts 
of modern life dictate a recognition of 
the claim on a public interest basis. 
For example, inadequate attention has been 
given to the plight of elderly women, fifty 
percent of whom have incomes under $1,800 a 
year. A pro rata interest in a former 
husband's pension or retirement benefits 
would improve the financial situation of 
some elderly women who have been divorced. 
In essence, these elderly women would benefit 
by such an interest if they regularly 
14 
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obtained their share of benefit payments 
when made ..• " Foster and Freed, Spousal 
Rights in Retirement Pension Benefits, 16 
Journal of Family Law 187 (1977-78). 
A review of the facts of this case demonstrates the 
truth of the authors' statements. The evidence showed the 
husband had worked for over 15 years and earns in excess of 
$12.00 per hour plus fringe benefits. The wife has very 
little work experience and earns slightly over $4.00 per 
hour at a job which provides no fringe benefits and provides 
no retirement benefits {T-53). 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents the court with an important 
opportunity. An opportunity to establish a policy which is 
logically and equitably sound. Too often in the past, 
various courts have proclaimed equality through equal 
division of the marital assets. Yet these very courts have 
ignored the fact that some of the most valuable assets of 
the marriage have remained outside the division and in the 
husband's wallet. This case presents the court with an 
opportunity to provide more meaning to the concept of equal 
rights. It presents the court the opportunity to reaffirm 
fairness as the basic principle of domestic property 
divisions. The trial court's decision should be affirmed as 
a matter of law. 
15 
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DATED this 
., J.. 
JD~ day of February, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MANN, HADFIELD AND THORNE 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to 
Brian R. Florence, Attorney for Appellant, 818-26th Street, 
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